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Headlines are not Bob Lipsey’s strength. But I know of no better contem-
porary reporter of quantitative trends in globalization. Deep, deﬁnitive,
discerning discourses are his hallmarks. And Bob is well into his third gen-
eration of “contemporary” professional reporting!
Headlines—memorable take-away points—are the ﬁrst focus of my
comments. As a two-generation devotee of Bob’s underappreciated work,
I am privileged to try to highlight and contextualize it. Someone needs to,
because many of Bob’s modestly and chronically understated ﬁndings ﬂy
in the face of widespread impression and intuition.
For example:
Nothing to the Hype
• It is not true, as sometimes alleged, that services are the growing fron-
tier of global trade. There is little trend in any of the various measures
of services trade relative to goods trade—the ratios of one to the other
oscillate between 20 and 30 percent over the past thirty-ﬁve (or more)
years.
Something to the High Tech
• It is no longer true that global services trade is dominantly travel and
transportation. In 2003, their share was barely half, compared to two-
thirds in 1983.
• “High-technology” services shares soared in the decade between 1983
and 2003, from 7 percent of total services trade (exports plus imports)
to 18 percent. (I am identifying high technology services with ﬁnance
and insurance, communications, and intellectual property [royalties
and fees]).
• Other business services, contrary to breathless commentary about
out-of-control oﬀshoring, have seen a slight decline in their global
share (roughly one quarter).
Anglo-Americans at it Again
• It is principallythe United Kingdom and the United States (and only pos-
sibly France) that seem to possess strong and secularly increasing mea-
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National Bureau of Economic Research.sures of revealed comparative advantage in services trade, unlike almost
every one of the other twenty-plus countries in this chapter’s data sample.
Phantoms of the Corporate Operations
• “Phantom” transactions—economically meaningless attributions—
increasingly pollute services-trade data, as services from intangible
capital and intellectual property become more important inputs to all
sorts of corporate operations worldwide. Where companies locate
such inputs geographically is purely discretionary, and often moti-
vated by minimization of taxes and regulations. The measured global
asset position of U.S. multinational corporate aﬃliates would shrink
to one-eighth of its recorded size if only tangible assets (plant, equip-
ment, inventory) were counted! A supplementary set of corporate-
ownership-based accounts would help identify and distill out such
phantoms, and would raise a spate of new research questions.1
But so what? Headlines and capsules for articles on page 24B of the lo-
cal paper hold distinctly low interest.
But I think these are page-one headlines!
They deserve page-one coverage because so much of services trade in-
volves inputs of various kinds, with the fastest-growing trade in high-tech
input services. Input trade generates gains from trade in much-vaunted na-
tional productivity, not merely in consumer purchasing power. Growth in
trade in high-tech input services may contribute importantly to the holy
grail of stronger national productivity growth. Finally, input trade aﬀects
national income distributions strongly when traded inputs substitute and
complement diﬀerently for workers of diﬀering skills and mobility.
But there is more to do here than headline hype.
My second focus is to describe two important gaps in Bob’s path-
breaking chapter; he is responsible for neither. One is services price mea-
surement. The other is human-capital services measurement.
Services Prices Scattered, Primitive, Untrustworthy . . . Inferring Trends
is Fraught
• Whether any of the interesting trends capsulized previously are also
true of the volumes of services and goods traded (i.e., whether they are
“real” in inﬂation-adjusted data) will remain an enormous unanswer-
able question for many years. Services price data are woefully primi-
tive and patchy, as Bob and other chapters in this volume discuss, es-
pecially for traded services.
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1. See Baldwin, Lipsey, and Richardson (1998), another Conference on Research in In-
come and Wealth (CRIW) volume, for discussion and examples.• If prices of traded services could be approximately tracked by U.S. do-
mestic implicit price indexes for services, then the threefold rise in ser-
vices prices relative to goods prices over the past seventy-ﬁve years
would seriously deﬂate the measured growth of services trade. In that
case, the real volume of services traded would have grown very slowly
compared to real goods trade, contrary to the ﬁrst bullet point.
• And without reﬁned price measurement for traded services by sector,
it is anybody’s guess how closely the value-based trends track the fun-
damental real trends in sectoral composition and comparative advan-
tage in the previous bullet points.
• Bob understands this. In response, he builds an implicit speculative case
for secularly declining traded services prices—even relative to goods
prices—by emphasizing (as the norm) the long decline of international
ocean-freight costs since the early 1950s, when they represented one-
third of all services trade. If Bob’s faith were to be accurate (and it may
be accurate for the rapidly growing values and qualities of high-tech ser-
vices), then realtrends in services trade would be sharper and largerthan
the values trends in the chapter. Faith, however, is all that supports Bob’s
conjecture, and faith is in this case a very slender reed—freight trans-
portation represented only 9 percent of overall services trade by 2003;
high-tech services only 18 percent (table 1.6); and the soaring domestic
relative prices of services is a strong counter-trend.
Below the Radar, Almost Completely: Human-Capital Services Trade
• Only in his section on rapidly growing educational services trade does
Bob pay much attention to human-capital services, and there to point
out important nonmeasurement; for example, imported human skill
when foreign students become legal residents. I think he should have
made more of this measurement gap in today’s allegedly growing
knowledge economy, and not only in education.
• In management and higher-skill occupations, temporary-worker
mobility (dubbed oﬃcially “movement of natural persons”) has
mushroomed, and has been legally embedded in bilateral and regional
trade treaties worldwide. Mere measurement of compensation funda-
mentals for such workers is rife with anomalies, arbitrariness, and in-
comparability. And that says nothing (nor does Bob) of more interest-
ing measurement issues concerning remittances, contributions to
properly-measured capital formation, native-input value added, and
so on.2
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2. Bob has worked intelligently on how to conceive exactly such measurements in an older
series of jointly-authored, below-the-radar papers: Kirova and Lipsey (1998a, 1998b),
Lipsey and Kravis (1987a, 1987b). Measurement authorities and their oﬃcial support-
ers have not followed up.• Trade negotiations in conventional services, both at the global and re-
gional level, will likely stagnate unless richer countries extend tempo-
rary-worker concessions to designated mid-skill and nonmanagerial
occupations, as advocated by India, the Philippines, South Africa,
Special Commissions, and others.3So-called Mode 4 services (trade in
temporary-worker services) currently represents only roughly 2 per-
cent of conventional services trade in the other three Modes,4 in all of
which richer countries are generally thought to have comparative ad-
vantage. Measurement of cross-border trade in skills and worker ser-
vices will ﬁnally become a priority when rich countries need to sit
down to calculate the value and costs of their reciprocally negotiated
services gains and concessions.
Bob Lipsey has for generations been a world leader at plugging the mea-
surement gaps in economic globalization. It is a privilege to be plugging his
plugging.
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